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Abstract
We provide the first differentially private algorithms for controlling the false discovery rate
(FDR) in multiple hypothesis testing, with essentially no loss in power under certain conditions.
Our general approach is to adapt a well-known variant of the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure
(BHq), making each step differentially private. This destroys the classical proof of FDR control.
To prove FDR control of our method we
1. Develop a new proof of the original (non-private) BHq algorithm and its robust variants
– a proof requiring only the assumption that the true null test statistics are independent,
allowing for arbitrary correlations between the true nulls and false nulls. This assumption
is fairly weak compared to those previously shown in the vast literature on this topic, and
explains in part the empirical robustness of BHq.
2. Relate the FDR control properties of the differentially private version to the control prop-
erties of the non-private version.
We also present a low-distortion “one-shot” differentially private primitive for “top k” problems,
e.g., “Which are the k most popular hobbies?” (which we apply to: “Which hypotheses have
the k most significant p-values?”), and use it to get a faster privacy-preserving instantiation
of our general approach at little cost in accuracy. The proof of privacy for the one-shot top k
algorithm introduces a new technique of independent interest.
1 Introduction
Hypothesis testing is the use of a statistical procedure to assess the validity of a given hypothesis,
for example, that a given treatment for a condition is more effective than a placebo. The traditional
approach to hypothesis testing is to (1) formulate a pair of null (the treatment and the placebo are
equally effective) and alternative (the treatment is more effective than the placebo) hypotheses; (2)
devise a test statistic for the null hypothesis, (3) collect data; (4) compute the p-value (the proba-
bility of observing an effect as or more extreme than the observed effect, were the null hypothesis
true; smaller p-values are “better evidence” for rejecting the null); and (5) compare the p-value to
a standard threshold α to determine whether to accept the null hypothesis (conclude there is no
interesting effect) or to reject the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative hypothesis.
In the multiple hypothesis testing problem, also known as the multiple comparisons problem,
p-values are computed for multiple hypotheses, leading to the problem of false discovery: since the
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p-values are typically defined to be uniform in (0, 1) for true nulls, by definition we expect an α
fraction of the true nulls to have p-values bounded above by α.
Multiple hypothesis testing is an enormous problem in practice; for example, in a single genome-
wide association study a million SNPs1 may be tested for an association with a given condition.
Accordingly, there is a vast literature on the problem of controlling the false discovery rate (FDR),
which, roughly speaking, is the expected fraction of erroneously rejected hypotheses among all the
rejected hypotheses, where the expectation is over the choice of the data and any randomness in
the algorithm (see below for a formal definition).
The seminal work of Benjamini and Hochberg [2] and their beautiful “BHq” procedure (Algo-
rithm 1 below) is our starting point. Assuming independence or certain positive correlations of
p-values [3], this procedure controls FDR at any given nominal level q. An extensive literature
explores the control capabilities and power of this procedure and its many variants2.
Differential privacy [10] is a definition of privacy tailored to statistical data analysis. The goal in
a differentially private algorithm is to hide the presence or absence of any individual or small group
of individuals, the intuition being that an adversary unable to tell whether or not a given individual
is even a member of the dataset surely cannot glean information specific to this individual. To this
end, a pair of databases x, y are said to be adjacent (or neighbors) if they differ in the data of just
one individual. Then a differentially private algorithm (Definition 2.2) ensures that the behavior
on adjacent databases is statistically close, so it is difficult to infer if any particular individual is in
the database from the output of the algorithm and any other side information.
Contributions. We provide the first differentially private algorithms for controlling the FDR
in multiple hypothesis testing. The problem is difficult because the data of a single individual
can affect the p-values of all hypotheses simultaneously. Our general approach is to adapt the
Benjamini-Hochberg step-down procedure, making each step differentially private. This destroys
the classical proof of FDR control. To prove FDR control of our method we
1. Develop a new proof of the original (non-private) BHq algorithm and its robust variants –
a proof requiring a fairly weak assumption compared to those previously shown in the vast
literature on this topic – and
2. Relate the FDR control properties of the differentially private version to the control properties
of the non-private version. Power is also argued in relation to the non-private version.
Central to BHq and its variants is the procedure for reporting the experiments with k most
significant p-values, or known as the top-k problem. To our knowledge, the most accurate ap-
proximately private top-k algorithm is a “peeling” procedure, in which one runs a differentially
private maximum procedure k times, tuning the “inaccuracy” to roughly
√
k/ε. Here we present
a low-distortion “one-shot” differentially private primitive for “top k” with the same dependence
on k, and use it to get a faster privacy-preserving instantiation of our general approach.3 The proof
1A single nucleotide polymorphism, or SNP, is a location in the DNA in which there is variation among individuals.
2The power of a procedure is its ability to recognize “false nulls” (what a lay person may describe as “true
positives”).
3For pure differential privacy, previous work (e.g. [5]) provides a way to avoid peeling by adding Laplace noise
of scale O(k). Conceivably, it is much more challenging to get the dependence on k down to
√
k for approximate
differential privacy, which is what we show in this paper.
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of differential privacy for our one-shot top k algorithm introduces a new technique of independent
interest.
Finally, traditional methods of computation of a p-value are not typically differentially private.
Our privacy-preserving algorithms for control of the FDR require the p-value computation to satisfy
a technical condition. We provide such a method for computing p-values, ensuring “end to end”
differential privacy from the raw data to the set of rejected hypotheses.
1.1 Description of Our Approach
The BHq procedure. Suppose we are simultaneously testing m null hypotheses H1, . . . ,Hm
and p1, . . . , pm are their corresponding p-values. Denote by R the number of rejections (discoveries)
made by any procedure and V the number of true null hypotheses that are falsely rejected (false
discoveries). The FDR is defined as
FDR := E
[
V
max{R, 1}
]
.
Algorithm 1 presents the original BHq procedure for controlling FDR at q. The thresholds
αBHj = qj/m for 1 ≤ j ≤ m, are known as the BHq critical values. The following intuition may
demystify the BHq algorithm. In the case that all m null hypotheses are true and their p-values
are i. i. d. uniform on (0, 1), then we expect, approximately, a qj/m fraction of the p-values to lie in
the interval [0, qj/m]. If instead there are at least j many p-values in this interval (this is precisely
what the condition p(j) ≤ qj/m says), then there are “too many” p-values in [0, p(j)] for all of them
to correspond to null hypotheses: We have j such p-values, and should attribute no more than jq
of these to the true nulls; so if we reject all these j hypotheses we would expect that at most a q
fraction correspond to true nulls.
Algorithm 1 Step-up BHq procedure
Input: Level 0 < q < 1 and p-values p1, . . . , pm of hypotheses, respectively, H1, . . . ,Hm
Output: a set of rejected hypotheses
1: sort the p-values in increasing order: p(1) ≤ p(2) ≤ · · · ≤ p(m)
2: for j = m to 1 do
3: if p(j) > qj/m then
4: continue
5: else
6: reject H(1), . . . ,H(j) and halt
7: end if
8: end for
Making BHq Private. There is an extensive literature on, and burgeoning practice of, differen-
tial privacy. For now, we need only two facts: (1) Differential privacy is closed under composition,
permitting us to bound the cumulative privacy loss over multiple differentially private computa-
tions. This permits us to build complex differentially private algorithms from simple differentially
private primitives; and (2) we will make use of the well known Report Noisy Max (respectively,
Report Noisy Min) primitive, in which appropriately distributed fresh random noise is added to
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the result of each of m computations, and the index of the computation yielding the maximum
(respectively, minimum) noisy value is returned. By returning only one index the procedure allows
us to pay an accuracy price for a single computation, rather than for all m.4
A natural approach to making the BHq procedure differentially private is by repeated use of
the Report Noisy Max primitive: Starting with j = m and decreasing: use Report Noisy Max to
find the hypothesis Hj with the (approximately) largest p-value; estimate that p-value and, if the
estimate is above (an appropriately more conservative critical value) αj < α
BH
j , accept Hj, remove
Hj from consideration, and repeat. Once an Hj is found whose p-value is below the threshold, reject
all the remaining hypotheses. The principal difficulty with this approach is that every iteration of
the algorithm incurs a privacy loss which can only be mitigated by increasing the magnitude of
the noise used by Report Noisy Max. Since each iteration corresponds to the acceptance of a null
hypothesis, the procedure is paying in privacy/accuracy precisely for the null hypotheses accepted,
which are by definition not the “interesting” ones.
If, instead of starting with the largest p-value and considering the values in decreasing order,
we were to start with the smallest p-value and consider the values in increasing order, rejecting
hypotheses one by one until we find a j ∈ [m] such that p(j) > αj, the “demystification” intuition
still applies. This widely-studied variation is called the Benjamini-Hochberg step-down procedure,
and hereinafter we call it the step-down BHq (the original BHq is referred to as the step-up BHq in
contrast). Their definitions reveal that the step-down variant shall be more conservative than the
other. However, as shown in [13], the step-down BHq can assume less stringent critical values than
the BHq critical values while still controls FDR, often allowing more discoveries than the step-up
BHq. In a different direction, [1] establishes that under a weak assumption on the sparsity the
difference between these two BHq’s is asymptotically negligible and both procedures are optimal
for Gaussian sequence estimation over a wide range of sparsity classes. This remarkable result
implies that, as a pure testing criterion, the FDR concept is fundamentally correct for estimation
problems.
Algorithm 2 Step-down BHq procedure
Input: 0 < q < 1 and p-values p1, . . . , pm of hypotheses, respectively, H1, . . . ,Hm
Output: a set of rejected hypotheses
1: sort the p-values in increasing order: p(1) ≤ p(2) ≤ · · · ≤ p(m)
2: for j = 1 to m do
3: if p(j) ≤ qj/m then
4: reject H(j)
5: else
6: halt
7: end if
8: end for
If we make the natural modifications to the step-down BHq (using Report Noisy Min now,
instead of Report Noisy Max), then we pay a privacy cost only for nulls rejected in favor of the
corresponding alternative hypotheses, which by definition are the “interesting” ones. Since the
driving application of BHq is to select promising directions for future investigation that have a
4The variance of the noise distribution depends on the maximum amount that any single datum can (additively)
change the outcome of a computation and the inverse of the privacy price one is willing to pay.
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decent chance of panning out, we can view its outcome as advice for allocating resources. Thus,
a procedure that finds a relatively small number k of high-quality hypotheses, still achieving FDR
control, may be as useful as a procedure that finds a much larger set.
Proving FDR Control. A key property of the two BHq procedures is as follows: if R rejections
are made, the maximum p-value of all the rejected hypotheses is bounded above by qR/m. This
motivates us to formulate the definition below.
Definition 1.1. Given any critical values {αj}mj=1, a multiple testing procedure is said to be
adaptive to {αj}mj=1, if either it rejects none or the rejected p-values are all bounded above by αR,
where the number of rejections R can be arbitrary.
In this paper, we often work with the sequence {αj}mj=1 set to be the BHq critical values
{αBHj }mj=1. As motivating examples, both BHq’s in addition obey the property that the rejected
hypotheses are contiguous in sorted order; for example, it is impossible that the hypotheses with
the smallest and third smallest p-values are rejected while the hypothesis with the second smallest
p-value is accepted. Nevertheless, in general an adaptive procedure does not necessarily have
property as it may skip some smallest p-values. For protecting differential privacy, this relaxation
is desirable because differentially private algorithms may not reject consecutive minimum p-values
due to artificial noise introduced. Note that this perfectly matches our “demystification” intuition.
Remarkably, an adaptive procedure with respect to the BHq critical values still controls the
FDR. This result also applies to a generalized FDR defined for any positive integer k [14, 15]:
FDRk := E
[
V
R
;V ≥ k
]
.
Built on top of the original FDR, this generalization does not penalize if fewer than k false discoveries
are made. Note that it reduces to the original FDR in the case of k = 1.
Theorem 1. Assume that the test statistics corresponding to the true null hypotheses are jointly
independent. Then any procedure adaptive to the BHq critical values αBHj = qj/m obeys
FDR ≤ q log(1/q) + Cq ,
FDR2 ≤ Cq ,
FDRk ≤
(
1 + 2/
√
qk
)
q ,
(1.1)
where C < 3 is a universal constant.
One novelty of Theorem 1 lies in the absence of any assumptions about the relationship between
the true null test statistics and false null test statistics. In the literature, independence, or some
(very stringent) kind of positive dependence [3] between these two groups of test statistics, is
necessary for provable FDR control. In a different line, Theorem 1.3 of [3] controls FDR without any
assumptions by using the (very stringent) critical values qj/(m
∑m
i=1
1
i ) ≈ qj/(m logm), 1 ≤ j ≤ m,
effectively paying a factor of logm, whereas we pay only a constant factor. This simple independence
assumption within the true nulls shall also capture more real life scenarios. As we will see, the
additive q log(1/q) term for the original FDR, i.e. FDR1, is unavoidable given so few assumptions.
Surprisingly, FDR2 no longer has this dependency, and FDRk even approaches q as k grows.
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Theorem 1 is the key to proving FDR control even if the procedure is given “noisy” versions of
the p-values, as happens in our differentially private algorithms. To determine how to add noise to
ensure privacy, we study the sensitivity of a p-value, a measure of how much the p-value can change
between adjacent datasets (Section 4.1)5. For standard statistical tests this change is best measured
multiplicatively, rather than additively, as is typically studied in differential privacy. Exploiting
multiplicative sensitivity is helpful when the values involved are very small. Since we are interested
in the regime where m, the number of hypotheses, is much larger than the number of discoveries,
the p-values we are interested in are quite small: the jth BHq critical value is only qj/m. We
remark that adapting algorithms such as Report Noisy Min and the one-shot top k to incorporate
multiplicative sensitivity can be achieved by working with the logarithms of the values involved.
Informally, we say a p-value is η-multiplicatively sensitive truncated at ν if for any two neigh-
boring databases D and D′, the p-value computed on them are within multiplicative factor of eη
of each other, unless they are smaller than ν (See Definition 4.1). The justification of the mul-
tiplicative sensitivity is provided by the definition of some standard p-values under independent
bounded statistics. Indeed as we show in Section 4.1, such p-values are O˜(1/
√
n) multiplicatively
sensitive6. With these results, we can show that our algorithm controls FDR under the bound
given in Theorem 1 while having the comparable power to the BHqsd (q).
Theorem 2 (informal). Suppose
√
kη/ε = o˜(1). Given any nominal level 0 < q < 1, the differen-
tially private BHq algorithms controls the FDR at level q + o(1).
Theorem 3 (informal). Again, suppose
√
kη/ε = o˜(1). With probability 1− o(1), the differentially
private BHq algorithms with target nominal level q makes at least as many discoveries as the BHq
step-down procedure truncated at k with nominal level (1− o(1))q.
The One-Shot Top k Mechanism. Consider a database of n binary strings d1, d2, . . . , dn. Each
di corresponds to an individual user and has length m. Let xj =
∑
i dij be the total sum of the the
jth column. In the reporting top-k problem7, we wish to report, privately, some locations j1, . . . , jk
such that xjℓ is close to the ℓth smallest element as possible. The peeling mechanism reports and
removes the minimum noisy count and repeats on the remaining elements, each time adding fresh
noise. Such a mechanism is (ε, δ)-differentially private if we add Lap(
√
k log(1/δ)/ε) noise each
time.
In contrast, in the one-shot top k mechanism, we add O˜(
√
k) noise to each value and then report
the k locations with the minimum noisy values.8 Compared to the peeling mechanism, the one-
shot mechanism is appealingly simple and much more efficient. But it is surprisingly challenging
to prove its privacy. Here we give some intuition.
When there are large gaps between xi’s, the change of one individual can only change the value
of each xi by at most 1, so result of the one-shot algorithm is stable. Hence the privacy is easily
guaranteed. In the more difficult case, when there are many similar values (think of the case when
all the values are equal), the true top k set can be quite sensitive to the change of input values.
But in the one-shot algorithm we add independent symmetric noise, centered at zero, to these
5Recall that adjacent datasets differ in the data of just one person.
6We use O˜ to hide polynomial factors in log(m/δ)/ε.
7In our paper, it is more convenient to consider the minimum-k (or bottom-k) elements. But we still call it the
top-k problem following the convention.
8For technical reasons, if we want the values of the computations in addition to their indices we only know how
to prove privacy if we add fresh random noise before releasing these values.
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values. Speaking intuitively, this yields an (almost) equal chance that on two adjacent input values
a noisy value will “go up” or “go down,” leading to cancellation of certain first order terms in the
(logarithms of) the probabilities of events and hence a tight control between their ratio.
To capture this intuition, we consider the “bad” events, which have large probability bias
between two neighboring inputs. Those bad events can be shown to happen when the sum of
some dependent random variables deviates from its mean. The dependencies among the random
variables prevents us from applying a concentration bound directly. To deal with this difficulty,
we first partition the event spaces to remove the dependence. Then we apply a coupling technique
to pair up the partitions for the two neighboring inputs. For each pair we apply a concentration
bound to bound the probability of bad events. The technique appears to be quite general and
might be useful in other settings.
2 Preliminaries on Differential Privacy
We revisit some basic concepts in differential privacy.
Definition 2.1. Data setsD,D′ are said to be neighbors, or adjacent, if one is obtained by removing
or adding a single data item.
Differential privacy, now sometimes called pure differential privacy, was defined and first con-
structed in [10]. The relaxation defined next is sometimes referred to as approximate differential
privacy.
Definition 2.2 (Differential privacy [10, 9]). A randomized mechanism M is (ε, δ)-differentially
private if for all adjacent x, y, and for any event S: PD[S] ≤ eεPD′ [S] + δ. Pure differential privacy
is the special case of approximate differential privacy in which δ = 0.
Denote by Lap(λ) the Laplace distribution with scale λ > 0, whose probability density function
reads
fLap(z) =
1
2λ
e−|z|/λ.
Definition 2.3 (Sensitivity of a function). Let f be a function mapping databases to Rk. The
sensitivity of f , denoted ∆f , is the maximum over all pairs D,D′ of adjacent datasets of ‖f(D)−
f(D′)‖.
We will make heavy use of the following two lemmas on differential privacy.
Lemma 2.4 (Laplace Mechanism [10]). Let f be a function mapping databases to Rk. The mech-
anism that, on database D, adds independent random draws from Lap((∆f)/ε) to each of the k
components of f(D), is (ε, 0)-differentially private.
Lemma 2.5 (Advanced Composition [12]). For all ε, δ, δ′ ≥ 0, the class of (ε, δ′)-differentially
private mechanisms satisfies (
√
2k ln(1/δ)ε+kε(eε−1)/2, kδ′+ δ)-differential privacy under k-fold
adaptive composition.
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Algorithm 3 Report Noisy Min
Input: m values x1, · · · , xm
Output: j
1: for i = 1 to m do
2: set yi = xi + gi where gi is sampled i.i.d. from Lap(2/ε)
3: end for
4: return (ij = argmini yi, xij + g
′), where g′ is fresh random noise sampled from Lap(2/ε)
2.1 Reporting top-k elements
Consider the problem of privately reporting the minimum k locations of m values x1, . . . , xm. Here
two input values (x1, . . . , xm) and (x
′
1, . . . , x
′
m) are called adjacent if |xi−x′i| ≤ 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
When k = 1, this is solved by Algorithm 3 stated below.
A standard result in differential privacy
Lemma 2.6. Algorithm 3 is (ε, 0)-differentially private.
Notably, directly reporting yj shall violate pure privacy. That is why we need to add fresh
random noise to xj . For the top-k problem, one can apply the above process k times, each time
removing the output element and applying the algorithm to the remaining elements, hence called
the peeling mechanism. By composition theorem, it is immediate such a mechanism is (ε, 0)-
differentially private if we add noise Lap(k/ε) at each step. Or one can add Lap(
√
k log(1/δ)/ε)
noise to get (ε, δ)-differential privacy by applying the advanced composition theorem [11].
Theorem 4. The peeling mechanism is (ε, δ)-differentially private. Assume k = o(m), then with
probability 1− o(1), for every 1 ≤ j ≤ k,
xij − x(j) ≤ (1 + o(1))
√
k log(1/δ) logm
ε
.
One naturally asks if we can avoid peeling by adding the noise Lap(O˜(
√
k) once and then
reporting the k-minimum elements. Such a one-shot mechanism would be much more efficient and
more natural. One major contribution of this paper is to show indeed the one-shot mechanism is
private.
3 FDR Control of Adaptive Procedures
We now study the FDR control of the adaptive procedures introduced in Definition 1.1 and then
prove Theorem 1. The class of adaptive procedures includes both the step-up and step-down BHq’s.
This serves as the first step in proving FDR control properties of our differentially private algorithm.
The “natural” way of making the step-down BHq differentially private is to add sufficient noise
to each p-value to ensure privacy and then run this procedure on the noisy p-values. But working
with noisy p-values completely destroys some crucial properties for proving FDR control of step-
down BHq. In particular, the jth most significant noisy p-value may not necessarily correspond to
the jth most significant true p-value. As a result, it is possible that this (in fact any) procedure
may be comparing this noisy p-value to the “wrong” critical values. In addition, some hypotheses
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with small p-values may even not be rejected due to the noise, so unlike in the non-private BHq
and its variants, there may be gaps in the sequence of p-values of the rejected hypotheses.
In the following, we show that even under the above unfavorable conditions, the FDR is still
controlled for any procedure adaptive to the BHq critical values αBHj . This provides theoretical
justification for the robustness of BHq observed in a wide range of empirical studies. While our
goal is to show that the step-down BHq still controls the FDR when the p-values of the input are
randomly perturbed, it is more convenient and general to consider the procedures which relax the
condition of BHqsd but on unperturbed (true) p-values.
To this end, the class of adaptive procedures, including both BHq and BHqsd as special examples,
is characterized in Definition 1.1. Compared with BHqsd, an adaptive procedure only requires all
the rejections below a critical value that depends on the number of rejections, but not that each
p-value is below the respective critical value. Further, it allows to reject only a subset of p-values
below some threshold. Surprisingly, even so an adaptive procedure still controls the FDR as stated
in Theorem 1. An novel element in Theorem 1 is that it only assumes independence within the
true null test statistics. Compared with other assumptions in the literature, this new assumption
is particularly simple and has the potential to capture many real life examples.
In the original proof of FDR control by BHq [2], it assumes (i) the true null statistics are
independent, and (ii) the false null statistics are independent from the true null statistics. Later, [3]
proposed a slightly weaker sufficient condition for FDR control called positive regression dependency
on subsets, which, roughly, amounts to saying that every null statistic is positively dependent on
all true null statistics. In sharp contrast, our theorem makes no assumption about the correlation
structure between the false null statistics and true null statistics, at a mere cost of a constant
multiplying the nominal level. To see an example that only satisfies our assumption, take i. i. d.
uniform random variables on (0, 1) as the true null p-values, and let all the false null p-values be 1
minus the median of the true null p-values.
We consider the bounds on FDR,FDR2 and on FDRk separately. Here we outline the proof for
FDR and FDR2 and leave FDRk case in the supplemented full version. In the following we prove
Theorem 1 in two parts. First we show the claimed bounds for FDR and FDR2. For FDRk, we
actually consider a related quantity
FDRk := E
[
V
R
;R ≥ k
]
.
Since V ≤ R, clearly we have that FDRk ≤ FDRk. We will show (3.3) holds even for FDRk.
3.1 Controlling FDR and FDR2
We will prove the result by constructing the most “adversarial” set of p-values. Imagine the
following game for a powerful adversary A who are informed of all the m1 false null hypotheses and
can even set p-values for them. The remaining p-values, which are all from the true nulls, are then
drawn from i. i. d. U(0, 1). Then A can pick out a subset S of p-values with the only requirement
that those p-values are upper bounded by α|S| for the critical values αj = jq/m. A’s payoff is then
the ratio of the true nulls (i.e. FDR) in S. The expected payoff of A would be the upper bound
on FDR for any adaptive procedure. If we require A only receive payoff when he includes at least
k true nulls in S, then the corresponding payoff is an upper bound of FDRk.
First how should A set the p-values of alternatives? 0! because this way A can include any
number of alternatives in S to push up the size of S so raise up the critical values but without
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wasting any “space” for including more true nulls. With this we can reduce bounding FDR to
bounding the expected value of a random variable.
We now present the rigorous argument below. Denote by N0, with cardinality m0, the set of
true null hypotheses, and N1, with cardinality m1, the set of false nulls. Define FDPk = V/(R∨ 1)
for V ≥ k and 0 otherwise. Given a realization of p1, . . . , pm, we would like to obtain a tight upper
bound on V/(R ∨ 1) with the constraint that the maximum of the rejected p-values is no larger
than αR. With this in mind, call (pi1 , pi2 , . . . , piR) the rejected p-values, among which V of them
are from the m0 many true null p-values. Hence, denoting by p
0
1, . . . , p
0
m0 the true null p-values, we
see
p0(V ) ≤ max
1≤j≤R
pij ≤ αR.
Taking the BHq critical value αR = qR/m and rearranging this inequality yield R ≥ ⌈mp0(V )/q⌉,
which also makes use of the additional information that R is an integer. As a consequence, we get
V/(R ∨ 1) ≤ V/⌈mp0(V )/q⌉. Hence, it follows that
FDPk ≤ max
k≤j≤m0
j
⌈mp0(j)/q⌉
. (3.1)
We pause here to point out that this upper bound is tight for the class of procedures adaptive
to the BHq critical values. Let j⋆ be the index where the maximization of (3.1) is attained. In
constructing the least “favorable” set of p-values and the most “adversarial” procedure, we set
pj = 0 whenever j ∈ N1, and let the procedure reject the j⋆ smallest true null p-values and
⌈mp0(j⋆)/q⌉ − j⋆ false null p-values (which are all zero). It is easy to verify the adaptivity of this
case.
Recognizing that the true null p-values are independent and stochastically no smaller than
uniform on (0, 1), we may assume the true null p-values are i. i. d. uniform on (0, 1) in taking
expectations of both sides of (3.1). In addition, it is easy to see that increasing m0 to m only
makes this inequality more likely to hold. Hence, we have
FDRk ≤ E
[
max
k≤j≤m
j
⌈mU(j)/q⌉
]
, (3.2)
where, as earlier, U(1) ≤ U(2) · · · ≤ U(m) are the order statistics of i. i. d. uniform random variables
U1, . . . , Um on (0, 1).
Taking k = 2 in (3.2), we proceed to obtain the bound on FDR2 in the following lemma. We
note that because of some technical issues, the following analysis applies to the case of k = 2. For
general k, we use a different technique to bound FDRk. See Section 3.2.
Lemma 3.1. There exists an absolute constant C such that
E
[
max
2≤j≤m
qj
mU(j)
]
≤ Cq .
To bound the above expectation, we use a well-known representation for the uniform order
statistics (e.g. see [6]): (U(1), . . . , U(m))
d
= (T1/Tm+1, . . . , Tm/Tm+1), where Tj = ξ1 + · · · + ξj , and
ξ1, . . . , ξm+1 are i. i. d. exponential random variables. Denote byWj = jTm+1/Tj . Then Lemma 3.1
is equivalent to bounding E (max2≤j≤mWj/m) ≤ C.
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Intuitively the maximum is more likely to be realized by smaller j’s as increasing j would increase
the concentration of Tj/j =
∑j
i=1 ξi/j. Then above expectation can be bounded by considering
a few terms of Wj for small j’s. Indeed this intuition can be made rigorous by observing that
W1, . . . ,Wm+1 is a backward submartingale, and hence we can use the well known technique to
bound Emax2≤j≤mWj by some statistics of W2, which we can then estimate. We present the
details as below.
Lemma 3.2. With Tj,Wj defined as above, we have that W1, . . . ,Wm+1 is a backward submartin-
gale with respect to the filtration (or conditional on the “history”) Fj = σ(Tj , Tj+1, . . . , Tm+1) for
j = 1, . . . ,m+ 1, i.e. E(Wj |Fj+1) ≥Wj+1, for j = 1, . . . ,m.
Now we apply Lemma 3.2 to prove Lemma 3.1.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Using the exponential random variables representation, it suffices to prove
the inequality in which E
[
max2≤j≤m qjmU(j)
]
is replaced by
q
m
E
[
max
2≤j≤m
jTm+1
Tj
]
= qE
[
max
2≤j≤m
Wj
m
]
,
where all the notations are followed from Lemma 3.2. Given thatWj/m is a backward submartingale
by Lemma 3.2, we can apply Theorem 5.4.4 in [7], which concludes
E
(
max
2≤j≤m
Wj/m
)
≤ (1− e−1)−1
[
1 + E
(W2
m
log
W2
m
;
W2
m
≥ 1
)]
= (1− e−1)−1
[
1 + E
( 2
mU(2)
log
2
mU(2)
;
2
mU(2)
≥ 1
)]
.
A bit of analysis reveals that the RHS of the last display is bounded. Hence, to complete the proof
it suffices to show that the RHS of the above display is uniformly bounded for all m. The fact that
U(2) is distributed as Beta(2,m− 1) allows us to evaluate the expectation in the last display as
E
( 2
mU(2)
log
2
mU(2)
;
2
mU(2)
≥ 1
)
=
∫ 2
m
0
u(1− u)m−2
B(2,m− 1)
2
mu
log
2
mu
du
v=mu
=
m− 1
m
∫ 2
0
2(1− v/m)m−2 log 2
v
dv ≤
∫ 2
0
2 log
2
v
dv ,
which is finite and independent of m.
Provided the bound on FDR2, we can easily obtain the bound on FDR. Taking k = 1 in (3.2),
we get
FDR ≤ E
[
max
2≤j≤m
j
⌈mU(j)/q⌉
]
+ E
[
min
{
1
⌈mU(1)/q⌉
, 1
}]
,
It is easy to show the second term is bounded by q log(1/q). The lemma below controls the second
term in the above display.
Lemma 3.3.
E
[
min
{ 1
⌈mU(1)/q⌉
, 1
}]
≤ q log 1
q
+ C0q ,
where C0 = 1 + 2/
√
e ≤ 2.3.
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This proves the bound for FDR in Theorem 1. Without a lower bound on the number of
discoveries, we suffer an extra additive term of q log(1/q). Here comes an explanation how does
this term emerge. Let p0min be the smallest p-value from all the m0 true null hypotheses and, to be
the most adversarial, all the false null p-values are set to zero. Then an adversary can reject R− 1
false null hypotheses, and then the true null hypothesis with p-value p0min, where R = ⌈mp0min/q⌉.
For large m0, E := m0p
0
min is asymptotically distributed as exponential with mean 1. If m0 ≈ m,
observe that
1
R
≈ q
mp0min
=
qm0
mE
≈ q
E
.
The partial expectation of the last term q/E on [q,∞) is approximately∫ ∞
q
q
u
e−udu = q log
1
q
+O(q) .
This justifies the logarithmic term log 1q .
3.2 Controlling FDRk
FDR control comes naturally for studies where a large number of rejections are expected to be made.
Provided with this side information, we can improve the constant C in (1.1) to 1 asymptotically
for R≫ 1. As mentioned earlier, we will provide an upper bound on FDRk.
Theorem 5. Assume joint independence of the true null test statistics. Then any procedure adap-
tive to the BHq critical values obeys
FDRk ≤
(
1 + 2/
√
qk
)
q . (3.3)
Proof of Theorem 5. Similar to the argument for bounding FDR and FDR2, it suffices to consider
the most adversarial scenario, where it always holds that
V ≤ #
{
i ∈ N0 : pi ≤ qR
m
}
,
which gives an upper bound on FDP:
FDP ≤ max
R≤j≤m
#{i ∈ N0 : pi ≤ qj/m}
j
. (3.4)
Similar to what has been argued previously, the above inequality still holds if all the null p-values
are m i. i. d. uniform on (0, 1). This observation leads to the proof of (3.3) by showing the following
inequality, again by applying tools from Martingale theory
E
[
max
k≤j≤m
#
{
1 ≤ i ≤ m : Ui ≤ qjm
}
j
]
≤ (1 + 2/√qk)q .
Denote by as usual Vj = #{1 ≤ i ≤ m : Ui ≤ qjm} and Wj =
Vj
j . Conditional on Wj+1, Vj+1 of
Ui are uniformly distributed on [0, q(j + 1)/m]. Hence the conditional expectation of Vj given by
Wj+1 is
E(Vj |Wj+1) =
Vj+1
qj
m
q(j+1)
m
=
jVj+1
j + 1
,
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which is equivalent to
E(Wj |Wj+1) =Wj+1 .
Thus, (Wj − q)+ is a backward submartingale, which allows us to use the martingale ℓ2 maximum
inequality:
E
[
max
k≤j≤m
(Wj − q)+
]2
≤
(
2
2− 1
)2
E(Wk − q)2+ ≤ 4E(Wk − q)2 =
4q(1− qk/m)
k
<
4q
k
.
Last, Jensen’s inequality gives
E
[
max
k≤j≤m
Wj
]
≤ q + E
[
max
k≤j≤m
(Wj − q)+
]
≤ q +
√
E
[
max
k≤j≤m
(Wj − q)+
]2
≤ q + 2
√
q
k
.
4 Private Adaptive Procedures
One alternative interpretation of Theorem 1 is that BHqsd is robust with respect to small pertur-
bation of p-values. That is if we add small enough noise to the p-values and then apply BHqsd
procedure, the FDR can still be controlled within the bound given in the theorem. It turns out the
additive sensitivity of p-values might be large, but the relative change is much smaller.
Now the important question is how to add noise. In the literature, often additive noise is used
to guarantee privacy. But this would not work well for p-values as BHqsd considers the p-values
in the range of O(1/m) but a simple analysis shows that the sensitivity of some standard p-values
can be as large as 1/
√
n, which can be much larger than 1/m. It turns out that while the additive
sensitivity might be large, the relative change is much smaller. This motivates us to consider
multiplicative sensitivity. Hence we will add multiplicative noise (or additive noise to the logarithm
of p-values). Together with the private top-k algorithm, this gives us the private FDR algorithm.
For the ease of presentation, we assume that we are given an upper bound k of the number
of rejections. The parameter k should be comparable to the number of true rejections and small
compared to m. It is easy to adapt our algorithm to the case when k is not given, for example, by
the standard doubling trick. This only incurs an extra logarithmic factor in our bound.
4.1 Sensitivity of p-values
Assume the input to our private FDR algorithm is an m-tuple of p-values p = (p1, . . . , pm) obtained
by running m statistical tests on a dataset D. Motivated by the normal approximation (or related
χ2 approximation) frequently used in computing p-values, the change in a p-value caused by the
addition or deletion of the data of one individual is best measured multiplicatively; however, when
the p-value is very small the relative change can be very large. This gives rise to the following
definition of (truncated) multiplicative neighborhood.
Definition 4.1 ((η, ν)-neighbors). Tuples p = (p1, . . . , pm), p
′ = (p′1, . . . , p
′
m) are (η, ν)-neighbors
if, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, either pi, p′i < ν, or e−ηpi ≤ p′i ≤ eηpi.
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The privacy of our FDR algorithm will be defined with respect to such neighborhood. Next
we will explain that some standard p-values computed on neighboring databases are indeed (η, ν)-
neighbors for small η and ν. We will give an intuitive explanation using Gaussian approximation but
omit the proof details. Consider a database consisting of the records of n people and a hypothesis
H to be tested, where each person contributes a statistic ti, i = 1, . . . , n with |ti| ≤ B (for example,
ti is the number of minor alleles for a given SNP.) In many interesting cases, the sufficient statistic
for testing the hypothesis is T = t1+ · · ·+ tn, and under the null hypothesis H, each ti has mean µ
and variance σ2. Then (T − nµ)/(√nσ) is asymptotically distributed as standard normal variable.
Assuming T tends to be larger under the alternative hypothesis, we can approximately compute
p-value p(T ) = Φ(−(T − nµ)/(√nσ)), where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of standard
Gaussian. Consider a neighboring database where person i is replaced, so T ′−T = t′i− ti. Writing
p′ = p(T ′) and invoking that Φ(−x) ≈ 1xφ(x) = 1x√2π e
−x2
2 for large x > 0, we can show that p(T )
is (η, ν) multiplicative sensitive for η ≈ B
√
2 log(1/ν)/n/σ = O(
√
log(1/ν)/n/σ).
4.2 A private FDR algorithm
To achieve privacy with respect to (η, µ)-neighborhood, we apply MPeel with properly scaled
noise to the logarithm of the input p-values (see Step 1 of Algorithm 4). Denote by ∆k =
(1 + o(1))
√
k log(1/δ) logm/ε the accuracy bound provided by MPeel. Then we run BHqsd with
cutoff values set as α′j = log(αj + ν) + η∆k. The details are described in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Differentially private FDR-controlling algorithm
Input: (η, ν)-sensitive p-values p1, · · · , pm and k ≥ 1 and ε, δ
Output: a set of up to k rejected hypotheses
1: for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m, set xi = log(max{pi, ν})
2: apply MPeel to x1, . . . , xm with noise Lap(η
√
k log(1/δ)/ε) to obtain (i1, y1), . . . , (ik, yk)
3: apply BHqsd to y1, . . . , yk with cutoffs α
′
j for 1 ≤ j ≤ k and reject the corresponding hypotheses
Our main result is that this algorithm is differentially private and controls FDR, while main-
taining a descent power. In particular, the second and third conclusions serve as, respectively,
formal versions of Theorems 2 and 3.
Theorem 6. Algorithm 4 obeys:
(a) It is (ε, δ)-differentially private;
(b) If BHqsd rejects k
′ ≤ k hypotheses, Algorithm 4 rejects at least k′ hypotheses with probability
1− o(1);
(c) Suppose ν = o(1/m), then the FDR of Algorithm 4 satisfies the bounds in Theorem 1 with q
replaced by eη∆k(1 + o(1))q.
Proof. (a) For two (η, ν) neighbor p, p′, by definition for each i, either pi, p′i ≤ ν or e−ηpi ≤ p′i ≤
eηpi. In either case, we have that |x′i − xi| ≤ η. Hence the privacy of Algorithm 4 follows
from the privacy of MPeel.
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(b) By Theorem 4, we have that with probability 1 − o(1), yj ≤ x(j) + η∆k. Hence if for
1 ≤ j ≤ k′, p(j) ≤ αj , then we have x(j) ≤ log(αj + ν). Thus yj ≤ log(αj + ν) + η∆k = α′j .
Hence Algorithm 4 rejects at least k′ hypotheses as well.
(c) Suppose that the algorithm rejects the set of hypotheses t1, . . . , tk′ , then we have that ytj ≤ α′j .
By Theorem 4 with high probability the corresponding p-value is bounded by eO(η∆k)(αj+ν).
By that αj = jq/m, Algorithm 4 is an adaptive procedure with respect to the cutoff
(q′/m, 2q′/m, . . . , kq′/m),
where q′ = eO(η∆k)(1+o(1))q. Then the bounds in Theorem 1 apply by plugging in eO(η∆k)(1+
o(1))q in place of q.
For the binary database with independent statistics, take η = O(
√
logm/n) and ν = 1/m2.
Then, from the discussion in Section 4.1 we get
Corollary 4.2. Algorithm 4 is (ε, δ)-differentially private. In addition, if k ≪ n/ logO(1)(m), with
probability 1−o(1), it rejects at least the same amount of hypotheses as in Algorithm 2 and controls
FDR at q log(1/q) + C(1 + o(1))q, FDR2 at C(1 + o(1))q, and FDRk at (1 + o(1))q.
One drawback of the above algorithm is that it needs to run the peeling algorithm which takes
O˜(km) time. This can be expensive for large k. In the next section, we show the privacy of one-shot
algorithmMos. By replacingMPeel withMos in Algorithm 4, we can obtain the Fast Private FDR
algorithm which has essentially the same quality bound but with running time O˜(k +m).
5 One-shot mechanism for reporting top-k
In the one-shot mechanism Mos, we add noise Lap(λ) once to each value and report the indices
of the minimum-k noisy values (Algorithm 5). Here the input to our algorithms is m counts
x = (x1, . . . , xm) which are the marginals of database D. So two set of counts x and x
′, representing
respectively the marginals of two neighboring databases D and D′, satisfy ‖x− x′‖∞ ≤ 1.
Using a coupling argument, it is easy to show by setting λ = O(k/ε), the one-shot mechanism
is (ε, 0)-differentially private.
Lemma 5.1. Algorithm 5 is (ε, 0)-differentially private if we set λ = 2k/ε.
Proof of Lemma 5.1. Let x = (x1, . . . , xm) and x
′ = (x′1, . . . , x
′
m) be adjacent, i.e., ‖x− x′‖∞ ≤ 1.
Let S be an arbitrary k-subset of {1, . . . ,m}. Let G consist of all (g1, . . . , gm) such that Mos on x
reports S. Similarly we have G′ for x′. It is clear to see that G − 2 · 1S ⊂ G′, where 1S ∈ {0, 1}m
satisfies 1S(i) = 1 if and only if i ∈ S. Hence we get
P(Mos(x) = S) =
∫
G
1
2mλm
e−
‖g‖1
λ dg ≥
∫
G′+2·1S
1
2mλm
e−
‖g‖1
λ dg
=
∫
G′
1
2mλm
e−
‖g+2·1S‖1
λ dg ≥
∫
G′
e−2k/λ
2mλm
e−
‖g‖1
λ dg = e−εP(Mos(x′) = S) .
On the opposite side, we have P(Mos(x) = S) ≤ eεP(Mos(x′) = S), which completes the proof
since S is arbitrary.
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Our goal is to reduce the dependence on k to
√
k for approximate differential privacy.
Theorem 7. Take ε ≤ log(m/δ). There exists universal constant C > 0 such that if we set
λ = C
√
k log(m/δ)/ε, thenMos is (ε, δ)-differentially private. In addition, with probability 1−o(1),
for every 1 ≤ j ≤ k, xij − x(j) = O(
√
k log(m/δ) logm/ε).
Unlike in the peeling approach, in which an ordered set is returned, in Mos, only a subset of k
elements, but not their ordering, is returned. The privacy proof crucially depends on this. If we
would also like to report the values, we can report the noisy values by adding random noise freshly
sampled from Lap(O(
√
k log(1/δ)/ε)) to each value of those k elements.
Algorithm 5 The one-shot procedure Mos for privately reporting minimum-k elements
Input: m values x1, · · · , xm, k ≥ 1, λ
Output: i1, . . . , ik
1: for i = 1 to m do
2: set yi = xi + gi where gi is sampled i.i.d. from Lap(λ)
3: end for
4: sort y1, . . . , ym from low to high, y(1) ≤ y(2) ≤ · · · ≤ y(m)
5: return the set {(1), . . . , (k)}
In Theorem 7, the quality bound on xij −x(j) is an immediate consequence from the properties
of exponential random variables. The claim on the privacy part is equivalent to the lemma below.
Lemma 5.2. For any k-subset S of {0, 1}m and any adjacent x, x′, we have
P(Mos(x) ∈ S) ≤ eεP(Mos(x′) ∈ S) + δ .
We divide the event space by fixing the kth smallest noisy element, say j, together with the
noise value, say gj. For each partition, whether an element i 6= j is selected by Mos only depends
on whether xi + gi ≤ xj + gj , which happens with probability qi = G((xj + gj − xi)/λ). Here
G denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard Laplace distribution. Hence, we
consider the following mechanism M instead: given (q1, . . . , qm) where 0 < qi < 1, output a subset
of indices where each i is included with probability qi. In the following, we will first understand
the sensitivity of qi dependent on the change of xi and then show thatM is “private” with respect
to the corresponding sensitivity on q.
Lemma 5.3. For any z, z′, where |z′ − z| ≤ 1, |G(z′)−G(z)| ≤ 2|z′ − z|G(z)(1 −G(z)).
Definition 5.4 (c-closeness for vectors). For two vectors q = (q1, . . . , qm) and q
′ = (q′1, . . . , q
′
m),
we say q, q′ are c-close if for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m, |qi − q′i| ≤ cqi(1− qi).
The following is the crucial lemma whose proof requires much technical work.
Lemma 5.5. Assume ε ≤ log(1/δ) and k ≥ log(1/δ). There exists constant C1 > 0 such that if
q and q′ are c-close with c ≤ ε
C1
√
k log(1/δ)
, then for any set S of k-subsets of {0, 1}m, P(M(q) ∈
S) ≤ eεP(M(q′) ∈ S) + δ.
We first show how these two lemmata imply Lemma 5.2 and then prove Lemma 5.5.
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Proof of Lemma 5.2. If k ≤ log(m/δ), then by Lemma 5.1, the mechanism is (ε, 0) private. Assume
k ≥ log(m/δ). Denote by Ik the random variable of the kth smallest element in terms of the noisy
count. For any given Ik = j and the noise gj = g, we have that P(i ∈ Mos(x)) = G((xj + g −
xi)/λ) := qi. Set q = q(g) = (qi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and i 6= j. Write Sj = {s/{j} : s ∈ S and j ∈ s}.
Then
P(Mos(x) ∈ S, Ik = j|gj = g) = P(M(q) ∈ Sj).
Since ‖x−x′‖∞ ≤ 1, we have that for any i, |(xj+g−xi)/λ−(x′j+g−x′i)/λ| ≤ 2/λ. By Lemma 5.3,
q and q′ are 4/λ close. Set λ ≥ 4C1
√
k log(m/δ)/ε, then q and q′ are ε
C1
√
k log(m/δ)
-close. Applying
Lemma 5.5 to q and q′ with parameters ε and δ/m, we have
P(Mos(x) ∈ S, Ik = j|gj = g) ≤ eεP(Mos(x′) ∈ S, Ik = j|gj = g) + δ/m .
Now we prove Lemma 5.5. Since S consists of k-sets, we first show that if
∑
i qj ≫ k, then
P(M(q) ∈ S) is small. This can be done by applying the standard concentration bound. Write
K = (1 + 2
√
log(m/δ)/k)k ≤ 3k (recall we assume that k ≥ log(m/δ)).
Lemma 5.6. Let Z1, . . . , Zm be m independent Bernoulli random variables with P(Zi = 1) = qi.
Suppose
m∑
i=1
qi ≥ (1 + t)k ,
for any t > 0. Then
P(
∑
i
Zi ≤ k) ≤ exp (−(1 + t)h(t/(1 + t))k) ,
where h(u) = (1 + u) log(1 + u) − u. Consequently, by setting t = 2
√
log(m/δ)/k, we have that if∑m
i=1 qi ≥ K, then P(
∑
i Zi ≤ k) ≤ δ.
The above lemma follows immediately from the classical Bennett’s inequality stated as follows.
Lemma 5.7 (Bennett’s inequality, [4]). Let Z1 . . . , Zn be independent random variables with all
means being zero. In addition, assume |Zi| ≤ a almost surely for all i. Denoting by
σ2 =
n∑
i=1
Var(Zi),
we have
P
(
n∑
i=1
Zi > t
)
≤ exp
(
−σ
2h(at/σ2)
a2
)
for any t ≥ 0, where h(u) = (1 + u) log(1 + u)− u.
With Lemma 5.6, we only need to consider the case of
∑
i qi ≤ K. But this is a more difficult
case. We first represent a set s ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} by a binary vector z ∈ {0, 1}m. Write Pq(z) as
Pq(z) =
∏
i:zi=1
qi
∏
i:zi=0
(1− qi) . (5.1)
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Now our goal is to show that for any S consisting of weight k vectors in {0, 1}m,∑
z∈S
Pq(z) ≤ eε
∑
z∈S
Pq′(z) + δ .
Denote by
S∗ = {z : Pq(z) ≥ eεPq′(z)} .
The proof of Lemma 5.5 would be completed by showing∑
z∈S∗
Pq(z) ≤ δ .
By (5.1), x ∈ S∗ if and only if that∏
i:zi=1
qi
∏
i:zi=0
(1− qi) ≥ eε
∏
i:zi=1
q′i
∏
i:zi=0
(1− q′i) . (5.2)
Write ∆i = q
′
i−qi. By the c-closeness of q and q′, we have that |∆i| ≤ cqi(1−qi). Taking logarithm
of the two sides and rearranging, (5.2) is equivalent to∑
i:zi=1
log(1 + ∆i/qi) +
∑
i:zi=0
log(1−∆i/(1− qi)) ≤ −ε .
To bound
∑
z∈S∗ Pq(z), consider the independent 0, 1 random variables Z1, . . . , Zn, where for each
i, Zi = 1 with probability qi. Define
ζi = Zi log(1 + ∆i/qi) + (1− Zi) log(1−∆i/(1− qi)) .
Let I be the indicator function. Then we have
∑
z∈S∗
Pq(z) =
∑
z
I
(∑
i
ζi ≤ −ε
)
Pq(z) = P
(∑
i
ζi ≤ −ε
)
,
where the last probability is over the distribution of Z1, . . . , Zm.
The rest of the proof is to prove that P(
∑
i ζi ≤ −ε) ≤ δ. It is easy to check that ζ1 + . . .+ ζm
has mean
m∑
i=1
(qi log(1 + ∆i/qi) + (1− qi) log(1−∆i/(1− qi)))
and variance
σ2 =
m∑
i=1
qi(1− qi) log2 1 + ∆i/qi
1−∆i/(1 − qi) .
Before applying Bennett’s inequality, we check the ranges of the centered random variables ζi −
qi log(1 + ∆i/qi)− (1− qi) log(1−∆i/(1 − qi)), which are bounded in absolute value by
max
1≤i≤m
∣∣∣∣log 1 + ∆i/qi1−∆i/(1 − qi)
∣∣∣∣ .
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Then Bennett’s inequality asserts that for any t ≥ 0,
m∑
i=1
ζi ≥
m∑
i=1
(qi log(1 + ∆i/qi) + (1− qi) log(1−∆i/(1− qi)))− t
with probability at least
1− exp (−σ2h(At/σ2)/A2) ,
where A = max1≤i≤m | log 1+∆i/qi1−∆i/(1−qi) |. Then, taking
t = ε+
m∑
i=1
(qi log(1 + ∆i/qi) + (1− qi) log(1−∆i/(1− qi))) ,
Bennett’s inequality concludes that
P(
∑
i
ζi ≤ −ε) ≤ exp
(−σ2h(At/σ2)/A2) .
Hence, the case of
∑
i qi ≤ K can be established by proving
σ2h(At/σ2)
A2
≥ log 1
δ
. (5.3)
The proof of (5.3) is deferred to the appendix. This proves Theorem 7 via first completing the
proof of Lemma 5.5.
6 Discussion
In addition to all the usual scientific reasons for investigating FDR control, our interest in the
problem was piqued by the following observation. As suggested by the Fundamental Law of Infor-
mation Recovery, exposure of data to a query causes some amount of privacy loss that eventually
accumulates until privacy is lost. This leads to the notion of a privacy budget, in which a limit on
what is deemed to be a reasonable amount of privacy loss is established, and access to the data is
terminated once the cumulative loss reaches this amount. This denial of access can be difficult to
accept.
In a sense the multiple comparisons problem describes a different way in which data can be
“used up,” to wit, in accuracy. This connection between multiple hypothesis testing and differential
privacy provided the seeds for an exciting recent result showing that differential privacy protects
against false discoveries due to adaptive data analysis [8]. Although often confounded, adaptivity
is a different source of false discovery than multiple hypothesis testing; resilience to adaptivity does
not address the problem studied in the current paper.
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A Technical Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.2. The proof is similar to Example 5.6.1 in [7]. By scaling, assume that ξi are
exponential random variables with parameter 1, i.e, Eξi = 1. Note that Wj is measurable with
respect to Fj . In the proof, we first consider the conditional expectation E(W−1j |Fj+1), then return
to E(Wj|Fj+1) by applying Jensen’s inequality. Specifically, note that
E
[
ξl
jTm+1
∣∣Fj+1] = 1
jTm+1
E(ξl|Fj+1),
since Tm+1 is measurable in Fj+1. Next, observe that by symmetry we get
E(ξl|Fj+1) = E(ξk|Fj+1)
for any l, k ≤ j + 1. Combining the last two displays gives
E
[
Tj
jTm+1
∣∣Fj+1] = E [ Tj
(j + 1)Tm+1
∣∣Fj+1]+ j∑
l=1
E
[
ξl
j(j + 1)Tm+1
∣∣Fj+1]
= E
[
Tj
(j + 1)Tm+1
∣∣Fj+1]+ j∑
l=1
E
[
ξj+1
j(j + 1)Tm+1
∣∣Fj+1]
= E
[
Tj+1
(j + 1)Tm+1
∣∣Fj+1] = Tj+1
(j + 1)Tm+1
.
To complete, note that Jensen’s inequality asserts that
E(Wj|Fj+1) ≥ 1
E(W−1j |Fj+1)
=
(j + 1)Tm+1
Tj+1
=Wj+1 ,
as desired.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. The order statistic U(1) follows from Beta(1,m), whose density ism(1−x)m−1
at the value x. Thus,
E
[
min
{
1
⌈mU(1)/q⌉
, 1
}]
≤ E
[
min
{
q
mU(1)
, 1
}]
= P
(
U(1) < q/m
)
+
∫ 1
q
m
q(1− x)m−1
x
dx .
In this display, the term P(U(1) < q/m) is simply equal to 1 − (1 − q/m)m ≤ q, and the integral
satisfies ∫ 1
q
m
q(1− x)m−1
x
dx ≤ q
∫ m
q
(1− y/m)m−1
y
dy
≤ q
∫ 1
q
1
y
dy + q
∫ m
1
e−y/2dy
≤ q log 1
q
+
2q√
e
.
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Proof of Lemma 5.6. Bennett’s inequality asserts
P(
∑
i
Zi ≤ k) = P
(∑
i
Zi −
∑
i
qi ≤ −tk
)
≤ e−σ2h(tk/σ2),
where σ2 =
∑m
i=1 qi(1−qi) ≤ (1+t)k. Invoking the monotonically decreasing property of σ2h(tk/σ2)
as a function of σ2, we get
P(
∑
i
Zi ≤ k) ≤ e−σ2h(tk/σ2) ≤ exp (−(1 + t)h(t/(1 + t))k) .
We now aim to bound t, A, and σ using the fact |∆i| ≤ cqi(1 − qi). First, using u − u2 ≤
log(1 + u) ≤ u for |u| ≤ 1/2, we have that∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
i=1
(qi log(1 + ∆i/qi) + (1− qi) log(1−∆i/(1− qi)))
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
i
∣∣qi(∆i/qi + (∆i/qi)2) + (1− qi)(−∆i/(1 − qi) + (∆i/(1− qi))2)∣∣
=
∑
i
(qi(∆i/qi)
2 + (1− qi)(∆i/(1 − qi))2)
=
∑
i
(qi(∆i/qi)
2 + (1− qi)(∆i/(1 − qi))2)
≤
(
c2
∑
i
(qi(1− qi)2 + qi(1− qi)2
)
by |∆i| ≤ cqi(1− qi)
≤ c2
∑
i
qi ≤ O(c2k) by
∑
i qi ≤ K ≤ 3k .
Hence, we get
|t− ε| = O(c2k) (A.1)
and ∣∣∣∣log 1 + ∆i/qi1−∆i/(1− qi)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣log 1 + c(1− qi)1− cqi
∣∣∣∣ ≤ c1− cqi = O(c).
Combining these results gives
A = O(c) . (A.2)
In a similar way, we have
σ2 =
m∑
i=1
qi(1− qi) log2 1 + ∆i/qi
1−∆i/(1− qi)
≤
∑
qi(1− qi)O(c2)
= O(c2k) . (A.3)
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Since uh(a/u) is a decreasing function in u, from (A.3) it follows that for any sufficiently large C2
σ2h(At/σ2) ≥ C2c2kh(At/(C2c2k)) ,
which, together with (A.1) and (A.2), gives
At/(C2c
2k) = O(c(ε + c2k)/(C2c
2k)) =
1
C2
O(ε/(ck) + c)) .
For any sufficiently large C1, set c = ε/(C1
√
k log(1/δ)) and choose a sufficiently large constant
C2. Recognizing k ≥ log(1/δ), we have
At/(C2c
2K) ≤ 0.5 .
Making use of the fact that h(u) = Ω(u2) for u ≤ 0.5, we have that
σ2h(At/σ2)
A2
≥ C2c2kh(At/(C2c2k))/A2 = Ω(t2/(c2k)) .
Owing to ε ≤ log(1/δ) and c = ε/(C1
√
k log(1/δ)), we set C1 large enough such that t = Ω(ε).
Consequently, we get
σ2h(At/σ2)
A2
= Ω(ε2/(c2k)) = Ω(log(1/δ)) .
This proves (5.3) and completes the proof of Lemma 5.5. Thus, Theorem 7 is proved.
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